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A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM: FROM LONDON TO
STRASBOURG BY THE NORTHWEST

PASSAGE?©
By MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN SEDLEY*
In anticipation of the United Kingdom's patriation of
the European Convention on Human Rights, the author
explores the possible impact that a Bill of Rights will
have on the U.K. system of justice from a European
and U.K. perspective. The author argues that, from a
European perspective, the U.K. has an established
history of yielding to supra-national law given its
membership in the European Union. However, from a
U.K. perspective, this will present new challenges, as
the constitutionality of domestic legislation is subject to
increased judicial scrutiny in ensuring conformance
with European Convention obligations. The author
argues that the pressures on Parliament to remedy
domestic legislation as a result of decisions made by
foreign judges on the European Court of Human
Rights will be a particularly challenging adjustment.
He concludes that, while there are lessons to be leamed
from other countries with bills of rights, the traditional
reluctance among U.K. judges to override the will of
Parliament will render the impact of such a document
unpredictable.

En anticipant 'adoption de la Convention europdenne
des droits de l'homme par le Royaume-Uni, l'auteur
explore, d'un point de vue britannique et europ6en,
l'impact possible d'une telle convention sur le systame
de justice britannique. L'auteur soutient que, dans une
perspective europ6enne, le R.-U. a traditionnellement
accept6 la pr6dominance du droit supra-national,
consid6rant son adh6sion au sein de l'Union
europ6enne. Toutefois, dans one perspective
britannique, cette convention pr6sente de nouveaux
d6fis, puisque la constitutionnalit6 de la 16gislation
domestique est soumise un examen judiciaire 61argi,
afin d'assurer sa conformit6 avec les obligations de Ia
Convention europdenne. L'auteur soutient que les
pressions exerc6es sur le Parlement afin d'ajuster la
16gislation domestique suite aux d6ecisions des juges
6trangers si6geant i la Cour europdenne des droits de
l'homme reprsente un d6fi de taille. II conclut que,
tandis qu'il y a des legons Atirer des autres pays i cet
6gard, la r6ticence traditionnelle des magistrats du R.U. a outrepasser le ddsir du Parlement rendra
impr6visible l'impact de ce texte.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It will seem extraordinary to a Canadian audience that a country
small enough to fit twice into Hudson Bay contains three separate legal
systems and is shortly to have three, possibly four, different political
systems within it. But if there is a country that has always demonstrated
what a confidence trick the term "nation-state" is, that country is the
United Kingdom. A state we certainly are-a very successful unitary
state in many ways, though one that has spent the whole of this century
grappling with the problem of a neighbouring country, Ireland, which it
annexed six centuries ago and which it can neither wholly govern nor
wholly let go. A nation we are not. We are Welsh, Scottish, English,
Northern Irish by culture, language, or domicile; by origin we now
represent every corner of the globe. We are, as you are, a people both
divided and held together by our geography, our history, and our polity.
It is this polity that is now changing shape as we watch. The
Labour Party, which with a very large majority now forms the
government of the United Kingdom, came into office in May 1997 on a
pledge to provide for the devolution of significant powers of government
to constituent parts of the United Kingdom-a deliberative assembly)
for Wales, and a parliament 2 with limited powers of taxation for
I See Secretary for Wales, A Voice for Wales / Llais dros Cymru, CM 371 (London: The
Stationery Office, 1997). This White Paper was followed by a referendum which, by a very slender
majority, approved what the Government of Wales Bill (November 1997) was to characterize as
"executive devolution."

The Welsh Assembly will have considerable powers of delegated

legislation.
2 The Scotland Bill (December 1997) provides for the transfer of primary legislative powers to

a Scottish parliament. But it reserves to the courts, with ultimate appeal to the Privy Council, any
issue of legislative competence.

Since the Human Rights Bill (see below) will be U.K.-wide, it

appears that in Scotland, unlike England or Wales, the courts will have the power to disapply
Scottish legislation that breaches the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. In

Northern Ireland, where legislation generally takes the form of Orders in Council, challenges for
non-conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights were likely to be constitutionally

unproblematical, but the impending political settlement there will change all this.
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Scotland. These major consitutional reforms are now at the top of the
legislative agenda. Together with them stands the renewed possibility of
a political and military settlement in Northern Ireland, again carrying
with it, if it happens, the near-certainty of consitutional reform in that
tormented comer of the United Kingdom.
The Labour Party has also in recent years reversed its
longstanding opposition to a bill of rights. Shortly before the 1997
election it published a policy paper, Rights Brought Home,3 proposing the
patriation of the European Convention.4 The Liberal Democrat Party,
which now forms a quasi-coalition with Labour, has long supported such
a move.
These are no more than facts. It is not my concern to evaluate
them. But the coming impact of them on our law and on our systems of
justice is every British judge's concern. It is a concern that can usefully
be addressed in a historical perspective. But the one thing to remember
in constructing such a perspective is that history cannot repeat itself:
every conjuncture of place and time is unique. There is no fixed
historical or political relationship, for example, between a constitution
and a bill of rights. A constitution, properly speaking, is the set of
arrangements for the distribution and exercise of state power; a bill of
rights (traditionally at least) is a series of protections for individuals
against the misuse of that state power. But because there are strong
constitutional implications in any such regulation of state power, it is
legitimate to regard a bill of rights as, potentially at least, a
constitutional document.
Constitution-making does not ordinarily create a turning point
for a society: more usually it symbolizes a turning point created by other,
more decisive, events. England's Bill of Rights of 1689, the American
Constitution of 1788 with its subsequent Bill of Rights, the French
Declaration des Droits de l'Homme of 1789, the new Constitution of
South Africa-these are instruments which have marked the triumph of
a new social and political order. The individual rights they have
enshrined have for the most part been designed to guarantee that the
new order will not slip back into the ways of the old. For this reason,
3 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill,

CM 3782 (London: The Stationery Office, 1997). The White Paper and the Human Rights Bill
which were still awaited at the date when this lecture was delivered were published at the end of

October 1997. The Human Rights Bill was introduced very shortly afterwards in the House of
Lords and at the time of publication is engaged on its parliamentary passage. It is expected to

become an Act during 1998 and to come into effect in 1999 or possibly 2000. Some of its key
elements are mentioned in the succeeding footnotes.
4 Supra note 2.
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bills of rights, for all their protestations of universality and of selfevident truth, are tied in large part to their own time and place. While
present developments in the United Kingdom cannot claim the epochal
character of those I have mentioned, it is likely that they will turn out to
have more than the merely cosmetic character of the many constitutions
which, seeking in country after country to create the illusion of change
where there is none, have sunk with barely a ripple-a fate which befell
your 1960 CanadianBill of Rights5 and (a stunning miscalculation) was
predicted by many in 1982 for Pierre Trudeau's Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.6 I will return briefly at the end of this paper to this
instance of the great conundrum of legal history-why were they so
wrong? Why, in other words, as both the friends and the foes of the
Charter acknowledge, has it changed the face of Canada as its
predecessor failed to do? And are there any predictors of what fate
awaits the United Kingdom's coming Bill of Rights?7
II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Convention8 itself has something of this epochal
character I have mentioned. It is technically a treaty signed by member
states of the Council of Europe, a grouping of west European states
formed in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was written in
1950, drawing heavily on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights9
adopted in 1948 by the United Nations, in the ashes of a regime which
had taken the world to the edge of the abyss of barbarism-indeed, had
plunged tens of millions of lives into it. It was among other things an
attempt, with a very considerable diplomatic input from Britain, to say
"Never again" to the violation by states of the norms of civilization. It
was also an attempt to ensure that the regimes that came to power in
5 S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III.
6 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,

c.11 [hereinafter Charter].
71 will continue to use this expression, although the statute will be called the Human Rights
Act. The Bill is a model of economical drafting, with only one obscure passage (cl. 6(5),
exempting-without defining-the "private" acts of public authorities). It requires European
Convention rights to be given effect so far as possible in applying primary legislation and
unconditionally in applying secondary legislation (save where the empowering statute leaves no
option) and in judging the acts of public authorities (which include the courts but exclude
Parliament).
8 Supra note 2.
9 UNGA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No 13, UN Doc.A/810 (1948).
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western Europe did not revert by stealth or inertia to such violations. It
is therefore the case today that what the European Convention contains,
and what it omits, are very much products of the time and situation in
which it was written. Its authors were not only looking over their
shoulders at the tyranny of Nazism; they were looking ahead at a Europe
in which strong pro-Soviet Communist parties were bidding for power.
It is unsurprising that, for these and no doubt other reasons, the states
that put together the EuropeanConvention placed their faith in the 19thcentury liberal paradigm of the autonomous individual whose natural
antagonist is the state; and that the European Convention therefore
treats the state as a necessary evil in whose favour exceptions have to be
made in what are otherwise the absolute rights of individuals. There is
no underlying collectivist notion that the state may have positive
obligations as a guarantor, if not a source, of individual security and
opportunity, and no bedrock of fundamental duties of respect that
individuals may owe one another.
Thus, the substantive rights set out in the European Convention
are these: the right to life; a prohibition of torture and of inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; a prohibition of slavery and forced
labour; a right to liberty and security of person; a right to a fair trial; a
bar upon retrospective criminal legislation; a right to respect for private
and family life, home and correspondence; freedom of thought,
conscience, religion and expression; rights of peaceful assembly and
association; and the right to marry and found a family. The First
Protocol,10 which the United Kingdom has ratified, adds the right to
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, to education, and to free elections.
The right in the European Convention to education is anomalous: it is the
only social and economic right in the document; food and shelter, for
example, are not there. The right to free elections, while vital, by
straining the language of rights illustrates my point about the philosophy
of the European Convention: for what is here being spoken of is in reality
a generalized obligation of the state, not an atomized individual right. If
such contemporary elements as a right to a wholesome environment are
to be derived from the European Convention, it will have to be by the
coercive process of reasoning by which the High Court of India during
the 1980s managed to extract environmental rights from the
constitutional right to life. The European Convention is, in short, very
much a product of a time and place that will not be in all respects those
of the United Kingdom in the twenty-first century.
1

0 Supra note 2.
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The European Convention does nevertheless contain three
important adjectival provisions: it requires every state signatory to
provide a domestic remedy for violations; it forbids the use of European
Convention rights to undermine the rights of others; and it assures the
enjoyment of these rights without discrimination on grounds which
include, but are not limited to, sex, race, and opinion. It is to these
provisions that I believe we shall need to look repeatedly if we are to
avoid the reproach levelled (whether justly or unjustly) at the way the
Charterhas been working-that it has tended to serve disproportionately
well those in society whose hands are already on the levers of power.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which exists to
adjudicate complaints that state signatories have violated the European
Convention, has not been idle in these years. It came into being in 1959,
nine years after the European Convention itself, recognized initially by
only eight of the member states of the Council of Europe. Today, when
membership of the Council of Europe has grown to forty and is certain
to increase further, it is recognized by all of them. It has developed a
sophisticated jurisprudence which has attempted, so far as a case-by-case
approach permits, to meet some of the criticisms and repair some of the
inadequacies of the European Convention. One important, if hesitant,
step has been the development of a concept of affirmative state
obligation-a duty not merely to refrain from invading individuals'
European Convention rights but to legislate in order to protect them.1 1
For example, the ECHR has held that the obligation to respect private and
family life may travel beyond simple non-interference by the state and
require affirmative legislation governing invasions of privacy by private
persons or organizations.1 2 The reason why this can be required is that
the European Convention, although a treaty and not a supranational law,
commits the entirety of each state signatory-judiciary, executive and
legislature alike-to observe its norms. Not only must executive action
conform to it; rules of procedure, common law and equity must do so;
and where primary legislation breaches the European Convention, the
legislature itself comes under a duty to pass an amending measure.13 In
11 This is much like the Canadian Supreme Court has recently done by requiring provinces to
compel health service providers to make interpretation available for the deaf: see Eldridge v. British
Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
12 See Airey v. Ireland (1979), Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 32; and Xand Yv. Netherlands (1985),

Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 91.
13 The Bill addresses this obligation by preserving Parliament's immunity from adjudication
and providing instead that a superior court, if unable to construe legislation compatibly with the
European Convention, may make a declaration of incompatibility. A fast-track procedure will then
enable ministers to amend the primary legislation by Order in Council; but judicial review of
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this respect, the European Convention differs fundamentally from the
Charter,which at least since RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.14 has been
known to exempt the court's own orders from Charterstandards and
which of course also permits explicit legislative derogation under section
33. It also differs from the New Zealand model,1S which requires the
enacted rights to yield to primary legislation that cannot accommodate
them. The European Convention is a treaty that binds the state signatory
comprehensively. Being a treaty, it is open in principle to reservations,
to derogations, and even to denunciation, but the political and
diplomatic disincentives to any such step are very great, and short of
these measures there is no proviso behind which a legislature may
shelter. 16 It is here that a peculiar problem will await us.
The United Kingdom has no constitutional court, partly because
it has no written constitution, but also because it is the ordinary courts
which by judicial review of governmental action from day-to-day play a
significant part in making and remaking Britain's organic constitution. It
is probable that, even if a tribunal such as the Privy Council has to
become the tie-breaker in boundary disputes over the newly devolved
powers of government, the implementation of the European Convention
will remain the business of the ordinary courts.1 7 But the Bill rejects the
North American systems by which the courts themselves are empowered
to give effect to their conclusion that a statute is inconsistent with the
European Convention by disapplying it. Secondary legislation and
administrative action of all kinds will of course be directly reviewable on
European Convention grounds. In relation to primary legislation the
superior courts will be empowered to make a declaration of
inconsistency, leaving it to Parliament to amend the law in the way it
considers best.
Suppose then that government disagrees with the domestic
court's view that primary legislation conflicts irresistibly with the
European Convention. At present there is no mechanism by which the
government of a state signatory can appeal to the Strasbourg court
against a decision of its own courts. There is a power in the Strasbourg
court to give advisory opinions, but it has never been used. This apart,
whether, when, or how they do it is expressly blocked.
14 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
15

New Zealand Bill of RightsAct, 1990, No. 109.

16 Except insofar as the "margin of appreciation" doctrine (see Part V below) provides a
hedge.

17 This is indeed the underlying policy of the White Paper and the Human Rights Bill, supra
note 3.
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the only way for a government to secure a final ruling will be to decide
not to give effect to the court's finding (if necessary by using its majority
to vote down any private member's amending Bill) and so provokeperhaps even invite and fund-an application to the Strasbourg court by
one of the individuals affected. This will be an unhappy and
cumbersome way of proceeding, but it seems an unavoidable by-product
of the history and purpose of the European Convention, which was to
provide a remedy in the Strasbourg courtfor an individual against a state
and not vice versa.
III. TWO PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.K. BILL OF RIGHTS
Let me look now at this coming change in our legal culture from
two other perspectives-one European, the other that of the
Commonwealth. Each has already left its mark on the United
Kingdom's proposed Bill of Rights; and each may leave much stronger
marks on the jurisprudence of rights which our courts are now to
develop. Together, they afford a useful context in which to evaluate
what is happening.
A. The EuropeanView
The adjective European needs some explaining in this context.
Most journalists, many politicians, and even some lawyers get confused
by the byzantine political structures of this region that proclaims itself a
continent but is, in fact, only the westerly end of a far larger land mass.
The European Convention1 8 is a treaty signed by member states of the
Council of Europe, a loose political union set up in 1949 and composed
of states on the western side of the Iron Curtain. It is, however, an
organization which has no independent legislative power or authority
over its members. The drafting of the European Convention was one of
its first acts. The United Kingdom was, in fact, the first state to ratify the
European Convention, but it was not until 1966 that it accorded its
citizens the right of individual petition to the ECHR, and it has declined
until now to make the European Convention part of its own law.19

18 Supra note 2.

19 Although schematically this is so, with the consequence that citizens have had to make the
long haul to Strasbourg every time the domestic courts have been unable to satisfy the requirements

of the European Convention, the pressure towards incorporation has been reflected in a growing
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Meanwhile, most other member states have woven the European
Convention into the fabric of their law-Germany by its Fundamental
Law; and France by a rule of domestic law which gives supremacy to
treaty obligations. In the United Kingdom a handful of liberals have for
almost thirty years argued for us to do likewise. Perhaps the most
prominent is Lord Scarman, who for decades now has argued with great
force and skill for a written constitution embodying both a Bill of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and a non-enforceable
Charter of Social Justice to set standards of economic and social
entitlement. The price paid for eventual success by these early
advocates of reform has been the scaling down of their project, first to a
simple Bill of Rights, then to one that does no more than reproduce the
European Convention, and lastly to one that is neither entrenched
against repeal nor superior to other legislation. This is the same path as
was recently trodden in New Zealand, where in 1985, building on
Canada's newly enacted Charter, a proposal was advanced by the
government for an entrenched Bill of Rights having the status of a
fundamental law. By the time it reached the statute book in 1990, the
Bill had become a simple statute prescribing how the general law is to be
modified and how other statutes are to be read if their wording permits
it. When, some months before taking office as Lord Chancellor, Lord
Irvine of Lairg in a speech to students of the Inner Temple described the
New Zealand Bill of RightsAct2O as "a uniquely British compromise," it
became clear that if his party won the election it would probably
21
appropriate New Zealand's solution.
There is, anyway, little appetite among Britain's judges, myself
included, for a power of life and death over Parliament's primary
legislation; though one has to recognize that neither the United States,
where early in the Constitution's life the Supreme Court awarded itself
this power, nor Canada, where in 1982 the Canadian governments
handed it over, has found it unworkable in practice. Nevertheless, to be
able to destroy without necessarily having the power to rebuild is not
alluring; and for an unelected judge to be able to declare that what a
freely elected Parliament has done is not permissible in a democratic
society requires a sophisticated understanding of the relationship of the
democratic process to the rule of law. But to stop the argument at this
regard shown by English jurisprudence for European Convention standards, for example, by
resolving any doubt about the meaning of an Act, and any lacuna or obscurity in the common law, in
favour of an interpretation or rule which conforms to the EuropeanConvention.
20

Supra note 15.

21 Though, as this article argues, any true analogy with New Zealand is exploded by the treaty
obligation, reflected in the Bill, for the legislature itself to conform to the enacted standards.
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familiar meeting point of constitutional and political discourse is not to
face up to the arguments of legal principle which point the other way. In
particular it is not good enough to say, as is repeatedly said in this debate
in the United Kingdom, that a fundamental law to which other statutes
must yield is contrary to our tradition of democracy. One reason why
this is so is that we do already have a fundamental law to which all others
must yield. This is not Magna Carta; it is not the Bill of Rights 1689; it is
not the Act of Union 1707 which united England and Wales with
Scotland; it is the EuropeanCommunitiesAct 1972.22
The European Communities in 1972 were the economic treaty
organizations to which only the most prosperous handful of western
European states initially belonged. The first was the European Coal and
Steel Community, set up in 1951.23 Then in 1957, by the Treaty
Establishingthe EuropeanEconomic Community,24 the original six states
pledged themselves not only to economic cooperation but to a measure
of joint government that necessarily involved a limited surrender of their
political and economic autonomy. The city of Brussels has become the
capital of a transnational governmental organization, now known as the
European Union (Eu), which has, at present, fifteen members and
applications pending from eleven further states, mostly from the former
Communist bloc. The United Kingdom entered this organization
following a referendum in 1972. To do so, it was required to legislate to
give primacy to the legislative measures of the European Economic
Community (EEC), and to accept as binding the decisions of the
Community's judicial tribunal, the European Court of Justice (Eci),
which sits not in Strasbourg but in Luxembourg.
It is only in recent years that the character of this commitment
has been driven home. In 1988 the U.K. Parliament passed a Merchant
ShippingAct, 25 which had the effect of limiting the number of foreign
vessels, including those of other member states of the EU, that could
register in Britain and fish in its waters. The EcJ held that this violated
the rights of Spanish fishermen under the Treaty of Rome, 26 and the
House of Lords in its judicial capacity was compelled to strike down as

22 (U.K.), 1972 c. 68.
23 Treaty Establishingthe European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.

140.
24 25 March 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
25 (U.K.), 1988 c. 12.
26 R. v. Secretary of Statefor Transport, kxparte FactortameLtd. and Others, [1989] E.C.J., C221 (LEXIS/NEXIS).
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much of the Merchant ShippingAct as was incompatible with the Treaty.
You will not find anywhere in the House of Lords' decision 27 the phrase
"fundamental law" or any homonym for it, but their decision-which
flowed inexorably from what Parliament itself had enacted in 1972-was
that the law of the EU now overrode all domestic laws; was, in fact, a
fundamental law by which Parliament itself was bound and of which the
courts were the custodians.
So the constitutional situation into which our new Bill of Rights
is to be introduced is far from the uncomplicated paradigm of Dicey's
imagining. The deference historically accorded by the courts to
Parliament's legislation has been breached a quarter of a century since,
by Parliament's own election to defer to the law of the Eu. This shift has
one particular implication which, though it sounds dry and technical, is
of radical importance: it has destroyed the doctrine of implied repeal.
The underlying objection in the United Kingdom to a
fundamental law has for generations been the democratic one that no'
parliament should be able to bind its successors. It is for this reason that
if two statutes are found to be inconsistent with one another, the later
one prevails: the hands of the later parliament, in other words, are not to
be tied by its predecessors. The European Communities Act 1972, for
reasons I have explained, changed all that, so that the Parliament which
in 1988 passed the Merchant Shipping Act had been divested by its
predecessor of the power to do so.
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 28 as I mentioned, reached
the statute book not only without the status of a superior or entrenched
law-neither of which is known there-but without even the support of
the doctrine of implied repeal. Instead, by section 4, it expressly forbade
the courts to treat it as overriding any earlier inconsistent legislation. I
am not going in this paper to attempt an evaluation of the success of the
New Zealand measure-which in the circumstances has been
surprising-but it is relevant to my theme that the price paid for it has
included a reversal of the very constitutional principle which it was being
sought to uphold. For by entrenching all previous, as well as future,
legislation to the precise extent to which it violates recognized human
rights, the New Zealand Parliament has actually reversed the principle
of implied repeal.
When the United Kingdom began to face up to the fact that in
1997 Hong Kong would be reverting to Chinese rule, it set about trying

27

FactortameLtd. and Others v. Secretaryof State for Transport, [1990]2 A.C. 85.

28

Supra note 15.
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to establish a set of human rights in that vibrant but often corrupt
colony. A Bill of Rights based (as in New Zealand) upon the
InternationalCovention on Civil andPoliticalRights29 was drafted. By a
fine stroke of irony, the legislature that adopted it3O in 1991 was itself
largely unelected. But it dealt in a principled way with the issue of
implied repeal and entrenchment. It explicitly overrode all prior
inconsistent legislation, but it was made to yield to any future legislation
that could not be construed conformably with it. Hong Kong, however,
had Royal Letters Patent which did service as its constitution, and by
amending these to forbid any future laws from infringing the new rights
the United Kingdom effectively entrenched them, at least for so long as
the People's Republic of China was prepared to respect them.
Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom has had
no difficulty in entrenching human rights as part of a constitutional
settlement. To take only one example, when Trinidad and Tobago
received their independence they were given a constitution, drafted in
Whitehall, which entrenched a series of fundamental rights against any
invasion by the state, the legislature included, and gave redress for any
violation. 31 The justification, no doubt, was that after generations of
colonial rule such countries had little experience of democratic
processes. But the entrenchment of individual rights is not principally a
shield against autocracy, since autocracy by definition pays little regard
to law. It is a hedge against one of the sidewinds of democracy
itself-the neglect by the majority of the rights of minorities, and above
all of the most important of all minorities, the minority of one.
B. The UK View
Let me return now to the United Kingdom, whose situation is
not that of any of those countries I have touched upon. For example,
while we have accommodated ourselves without openly saying so to the
concept of a fundamental law, the European CommunitiesAct 1972, that
law itself is probably capable of being repealed without any special

2916 December 1966, U.K.T.S. 6 (1977) [hereinafter ICCPR].
30

See the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, 1991 (Cap 383).

31 See R.L. Maharaj v. A-G of Trinidadand Tobago, [1979] A.C. 385 (H.L.). By a fine stroke
of historical irony, Mr. Maharaj is now the attorney general for Trinidad and Tobago.
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majority if Britain should ever decide to withdraw from the EU. 32 The
political reality is that no law is so fundamental that it can never be
changed.
But of more immediate importance is the fact that the
non-entrenchment and ostensibly attenuated status of the United
Kingdom's Bill of Rights will not be-as it is in New Zealand-the end
of the story. Where the New Zealand model requires the citizen to live
with the fact that his or her statutory rights cannot be upheld because
another Act of Parliament trumps them, if either the domestic courts or
the Strasbourg court hold our primary legislation to be deficient,
Parliament itself, as an emanation of the Crown, will come under a
treaty obligation to remedy the defect. In this respect patriation, though
taking the ostensibly weak New Zealand form, will, it seems, give the
European Convention a force that even the Charterlacks.
The new Bill of Rights will call upon the courts to interpret any
domestic legislation so far as possible so as to conform with the
European Convention before falling back on a declaration of
inconsistency. This has, of course, always been a canon of construction
of statutes passed subsequently to the signature of a material treaty, but
it will acquire a new urgency when the court's inability to make a statute
fit the European Convention has direct repercussions for the legislature.
If one goes by plain and ordinary meaning alone, in the great majority of
cases there will be no room for movement or reinterpretation. It will
only be in the rare case where there is no plain meaning that the
European Convention right will serve as a tie-breaker-assuming that at
least one of the possible meanings has a human rights dimension. So
either this new canon of construction will be of only occasional
relevance, or we shall need to adopt a new approach-not of asking first
and foremost what the words mean, but of asking whether they can be
made to bear a meaning consistent with the EuropeanConvention.33 In
answering the question the courts will not, of course, be obliged to
distort the drafter's language; but to the extent that they decline to do so
they will be compelling Parliament to bring in amending legislation or to
expose the United Kingdom to censure in Strasbourg. The choice itself
32 I say "probably" because the Australian attorney general has advised that the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 54, prevents unilateral
withdrawal from international covenants which do not themselves permit withdrawal. The Treaty of
Rome, like the IccpR, does not permit withdrawal; the EuropeanConvention does.
33 A bold approach to this problem has now been commended by the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Irvine of Lairg, in his Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture 16 December 1997, (1998) P.L. 221. He
instances the strongly purposive construction given by the House of Lords in its judicial capacity to

domestic legislation in order to secure conformity with European Union requirements.
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is likely to be problematical; the option of forcing a statute to speak
words which it does not contain, even more so.
This is what gives its attraction to a paper 34 submitted by a group
of barristers who are among the most experienced English human rights
practitioners. They have urged government to take a road which is
closer to Canada's than to New Zealand's, though closest of all to Hong
Kong's, by enacting a double-barrelled interpretation clause: all existing
statute law is to have effect subject to the European Convention-in
other words, to the extent that it is incompatible, the doctrine of implied
repeal will operate; and all future statute law is, if possible, to be
similarly construed-meaning that if there is plain inconsistency the will
of the later Parliament prevails. The first limb of this provision would
eliminate the need for verbal casuistry in respect of pre-existing
legislation: if it did not fit intelligibly with the European Convention it
would have to yield. The second limb would affect only legislation
passed in the presence of the Bill of Rights, so that to apply a
presumption of compatibility would be to give effect to Parliament's
known intention-save where the conflict was so sharp that the intention
must have been for the later legislation to override the earlier. The
attraction of this proposal is that it arguably respects our constitutional
conventions, an aim that government understandably prioritizes, more
faithfully than does the "infiltration" model which has so far been
preferred. The efficacy of it is that, without insult to the particular
manner of British parliamentary drafting, it would steer the courts
between the Scylla of impotence and the Charybdis of verbal casuistry.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
I want to turn now to a distinct but ultimately related question,
the composition and functioning of the ECHR. It is composed of one
judge for each member state3 5 There is no agreed career pathway to
this particular bench. Each state is asked to nominate three candidates,
from whom the Parliamentary Assembly is expected to select the firstnamed-itself an unfortunate charade of choice. Naturally enough, each

34 M. Beloff et al., Incorporatingthe European Convention on Human Rights: A Proposal

(Submission to the Secretary of State, July 1997) [unpublished]. The White Paper, supra note 3,
however, rejected this approach.
35 Since the European Convention does not require judges to be citizens of the state they

represent, Liechtenstein has taken the shrewd step of nominating a distinguished Canadian judge,
Ronald St. John Macdonald, as its member of the court.
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member state has different bases of nomination. The United Kingdom
has so far not sent any of its professional judges to sit in Strasbourg. In
fact, one side-effect of the externality of the European Convention has
been that it is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that is responsible
for Britain's relations with the Court, and not the Home Office or the
law offices of the Crown or the Lord Chancellor's Department which
between them do the work of a ministry of justice. But the candidates
have been chosen, as our judges are chosen, solely on professional merit
and with a rigorous disregard of their politics. Other member states,
Germany for example, find this remarkable: the first question they ask
about a candidate for judicial office is what is his or her political
affiliation. The shock this sends through a British, and probably too a
Canadian, lawyer's frame may be salutary. Do professional judges have
a moral monopoly on human rights issues? Are political criteria of
choice necessarily inimical to judicial quality? One has only to think of
Bora Laskin, a distinguished academic appointed directly to high judicial
office, to realize that there are more paths to judicial wisdom than the
conventional career path; and one has only to think of Earl Warren, a
Republican governor placed in the chief justice's chair of the United
States Supreme Court by way of a political deal, to appreciate the reality
of a judicial autonomy that defies both predictions and politics.
But it is a long stride from such accidents of history to the kind of
systematic political jobbery that once tainted both the English and the
Canadian bench, and no one could regard with equanimity the possibility
of judges joining the ECHR as part of a member state's system of political
rewards. A perhaps more immediately troubling illustration of the want
of agreed nomination criteria and procedures is the fact that there is still
only one woman on the court. One has an uncomfortable feeling that, in
most member states, men in government are still nominating other men
to sit on the court.
Until now the judicial structure in Strasbourg has been unwieldy.
Claims have gone first to a judicial commission which reports its initial
view. Three-quarters of all cases are sifted out at this stage as
unarguable. Those cases in which the commission concludes that there
has been a violation of the European Convention go on to the court for a
full hearing unless meanwhile the member state and the complainant
reach an accommodation. Under the new Eleventh Protocol3 6 all this is
to be replaced by a unitary court that will sit in much smaller divisions
than hitherto. Its membership will be restricted to the thirty-six Council
of Europe members who have signed up to the European Convention in
36

Supra note 2. The Eleventh Protocol will take effect 1 November 1998.
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full, which at present excludes Russia, Ukraine, and Croatia. At present,
a decision is made sometimes by a chamber of nine but more commonly
by between twelve and twenty judges sitting in banco, with the occasional
reference of a major case to a Grand Chamber of twenty-one or more
judges. Under the new structure, the Court will consist of committees of
three to decide on admissibility and chambers of seven or nine to decide
substantive cases, with a Grand Chamber of between seventeen and
twenty-one to take referrals of particularly important cases and to hear
appeals. This division of labour has been made possible principally by
the accession of a large number of new states to the Council of Europe
and to the European Convention, a number that is now heading into the
forties.
While the consequent multiplication of tribunals will be of
practical value in shifting what is at present an unacceptably slowmoving workload, its other consequences are more uncertain. The first
thing every practitioner before your courts and ours wants to know is
which judges are going to be trying the case. So far this has tended not
to be so in Strasbourg, where personalities and nationalities have been
eclipsed by the sheer size of the tribunal. But when the court consists of
seven judges, who they are and where they come from may start to
matter. I do not suggest that it is going to determine outcomes: judicial

independence is as real in Strasbourg as elsewhere. But the welcome
given in, say, Denmark to a decision as to whether the Danish state has
violated someone's freedom of conscience, taken by a court composed of
judges from (to take seven state signatories at random) Turkey,
Andorra, Cyprus, Slovenia, Latvia, Malta, and Romania may not be
exactly warm. We have already seen examples of this in the United
Kingdom, where the court's decision by a majority of one that Britain
had breached the European Convention when undercover soldiers in
Gibraltar shot dead three IRA terrorists was greeted with anger by much
of the British press. Journalists discovered-what every informed
person had known for some time-that judges from former Communist
states were sitting on the court, and for the tabloids this afforded a
handy explanation of the outcome. One of them explained that these
were judges who had no tradition of independence and were used to
deciding whatever their political masters told them to decide. A second
tabloid explained that these were judges who were heady with their new
freedom from political control and were ready to criticize any

government for doing anything. The moral, I think, is that while it is not
helpful to personalize the decisions of the ECHR, the experience of
bowing to the decisions of foreign judges on how we should treat our
own citizens is one that will become both increasingly familiar and on
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occasion increasingly painful as the jurisprudence of the European
Convention flows into the veins of our legal and administrative systems.
V. FUTURE OUTLOOK
This brings me to the final matter on which I want briefly to
reflect. It is without doubt possible to discern in the decisions of the
ECHR, over time, changes in the direction and tenor of its jurisprudence.
One of the sharpest has been its recent shift towards according the
United Kingdom a generous margin of appreciation in the observance of
European Convention standards. The margin of appreciation is the
leeway allowed by the court between the strict application of the
European Convention and the degree of autonomy accepted as
appropriate to a member state's own traditions and situation. The shift
followed open protest and pressure by the United Kingdom government
in the mid-1990s, backed by domestic urgings to withdraw from the
EuropeanConvention if the tide of adverse decisions did not recede.
The occurrence of larger mood-swings within legal systems is
well known. Why they happen is not. There is a readily explicable
tendency to put it down to personalities, for the giving of reasoned
judgments makes it easy to allocate particular judicial views to particular
judges. Supporters of the Charter,I know, have been going through such
a process as-for many liberals-disappointment has followed
disappointment in the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions.
I would caution against such an analysis, at least as an exhaustive
explanation of mood-change. It assumes that individual judges are a
fixed quantity, when experience repeatedly shows that many, perhaps
most, of them are not. It was of the great American civil rights judge,
Hugo Black, who in his youth had belonged to the Ku Klux Klan, that
someone remarked: "He began by putting on a white robe and scaring
black folks; he ended by putting on a black robe and scaring white folks."
Judges have a stony path to tread between independence of
judgment and sensitivity to public feeling. Like others they can be
misled into confusing the background noise made by a vocal segment of
the press with public opinion. The escalation of sentencing since 1992,
which has now filled Britain's gaols to bursting point, appears to be an
artefact of just such a phenomenon. Yet, to ignore such sounds would
be equally mistaken. It is only because we have listened to public
concerns about the level of sentencing in rape cases that, with the
support of the Court of Appeal, English trial judges now impose
reasonably tough sentences on rapists.
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But it is something different and more profound that shapes the
jurisprudence of supreme and superior courts over time. The
conventional wisdom is that it was the sudden conversion of the United
States Supreme Court to racial integration in education3 7 which in 1953
sparked the civil rights movement. The truth is almost certainly the
reverse. Similarly, the courts that throughout the common law world
had spent decades sabotaging legislation designed to give women the
vote and the right to enter the professions were only finally brought into
line with reality when in 1929 the Privy Council in London declared on
an appeal from the Canadian Supreme Court that women were
"persons" and so eligible for appointment to the Senate. It was in giving
the Privy Council's decision that Lord Sankey, the Lord Chancellor,
coined the metaphor which your Supreme Court has made part of its
Charterjurisprudence-the image of the Constitution as a living tree
"capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits." 38
There is another apect of the metaphor, however, that deserves
attention in this context. A tree has seasons of growth and greening;
from time to time it has to shed dead wood; and seasonally-the maple
most strikingly of all-when its leaves have first turned to flame and then
fallen, it might be taken for dead. There can be, I believe, a cyclical
element in a court's thinking, of which the court itself will not necessarily
be fully conscious. It becomes concerned at the expansiveness of its
growth and seeks security in retrenchment; or it becomes embarrassed at
its conservatism and breaks out with brave new doctrines. These are not
regular or spontaneous cycles. They are situations which develop and,
like all fixed states, become ripe for change; but in which change comes
only when the winds bring it.
VI. CONCLUSION
So the only thing that can, I think, be safely predicted as the
United Kingdom adopts its own Bill of Rights is that its enactment will
not be followed by a linear progression from a system without inbuilt
human rights to a system with them. Partly this is because of the unique
situation in which a supra-national instrument is being patriated; partly
because of the jurisprudential mechanism by which it is to be given
effect; but mainly because the experience of other countries with whom
we share a legal tradition, Canada prominent among them, tells us that
37 See Brown v. Boardof Educationof Topeka, 345 U.S. 972 (1954).
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Edwards v. Attorney Generalof Canada,[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136.
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you can predict neither whether the wind will be there to fill the sails of a
new rights instrument, nor when or why it may find itself becalmed or
possibly even grounded. Canada has now, in the view of many
commentators, experienced both the wind and the calm. If we knew why
the Charter, which came in on the back of no new constitutional
settlement, had taken on such a vigorous (if controversial) life, or why it
seems now to have entered a more cautious phase (middle age, you
might say), it might be easier to make predictions about how the United
Kingdom will fare with its Bill of Rights. As it is, I can only say that to
travel the short distance from London to Strasbourg by way of the
Northwest Passage is not a fool's errand. It takes us not only close to
Canada but enables us to make landfalls in other places, from all of
which the United Kingdom can learn something of value. What we
make of it, however, will be our own responsibility, and Canadians, I
hope, will watch our efforts in a spirit of not too patronizing interest.

